2008 Woodie Awards
U.S. diplomatic efforts aim to ease Middle East conflict
Michael Bain
Issue date: 10/16/07 Section: OpEd Page
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is in the midst of an intense four-day Middle East tour that, from a policy perspective, is coming six years later than it should have, compromising the potential for success and further complicating the issues to be resolved.
Hoping to salvage her legacy as well as generate stability in the conflict riddled Levant, Rice is proposing a similar solution to the one abruptly dropped by the Bush administration after winning the White House in 2001. While refocusing the United States' diplomatic energies on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial to achieving regional stability and protecting U.S. interests in the Middle East, the Bush White House's track record, low regard by regional actors, and lame duck image has reduced its ability to be an effective arbitrator.
For nearly six years prior to President Bush's July announcement of a fall 2007 peace conference, the Administration has put the Israeli-Palestinian issue on the back burner. There were definite stumbling blocks to realizing a two-state solution in 2001, particularly Yasser Arafat's inability to broker a deal; some have suggested that it only dawned on President Bill Clinton following the breakdown of the Camp David accords that Arafat lacked the ability to be a post-conflict leader.
Yet by utterly disregarding the importance of continuing the Clinton-era efforts and by adopting a vociferously pro-Israel stance, Bush has destroyed his administration's perceived commitment to realizing a just outcome.
Indeed, a major portion of Rice's Sunday meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was dedicated to reassuring him of the United State's dedication to achieving peace.
Part of the difficulty with picking up the ball again lies in Rice's
support of a two-state solution. While this used to be the most desirable and seemingly attainable policy solution, the fracture in political control between the West Bank, which remains in the hands of Abbas, and Gaza, which is ruled by Hamas, raises the question of whether a three-state solution will be needed to quell the violence. Moreover, lacking diplomatic recognition and a viable economy, Gaza continues to be strangled, creating a desperate and radicalized population. For real, meaningful diplomatic progress to be made, Gaza must be factored into future negotiations.
Fundamentally, however, the decision to again center U.S. Middle East policy on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the right one, and it will hopefully lay the groundwork for real progress to be made in the future. Positive signs have come from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who has expressed willingness for the first time to relinquish control of certain areas of Jerusalem.
Likewise, Israeli and Palestinian teams have been meeting to discuss the contents of a document that will used as the basis for negotiations at the Annapolis conference in November. While these are baby steps, they do indicate that the U.S. has helped kick start the peace process again and that all sides are willing to come to the table. It is a shame that this American desire to facilitate meaningful negotiations has been so late in coming.
Hoping to salvage her legacy as well as generate stability in the conflict riddled Levant, Rice is proposing a similar solution to the one abruptly dropped by the Bush administration after winning the White House in 2001. While refocusing the United States' diplomatic energies on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial to achieving regional stability and protecting U.S. interests in the Middle East, the Bush White House's track record, low regard by regional actors, and lame duck image has reduced its ability to be an effective arbitrator.
For nearly six years prior to President Bush's July announcement of a fall 2007 peace conference, the Administration has put the Israeli-Palestinian issue on the back burner. There were definite stumbling blocks to realizing a two-state solution in 2001, particularly Yasser Arafat's inability to broker a deal; some have suggested that it only dawned on President Bill Clinton following the breakdown of the Camp David accords that Arafat lacked the ability to be a post-conflict leader.
Yet by utterly disregarding the importance of continuing the Clinton-era efforts and by adopting a vociferously pro-Israel stance, Bush has destroyed his administration's perceived commitment to realizing a just outcome.
Indeed, a major portion of Rice's Sunday meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was dedicated to reassuring him of the United State's dedication to achieving peace.
Part of the difficulty with picking up the ball again lies in Rice's
support of a two-state solution. While this used to be the most desirable and seemingly attainable policy solution, the fracture in political control between the West Bank, which remains in the hands of Abbas, and Gaza, which is ruled by Hamas, raises the question of whether a three-state solution will be needed to quell the violence. Moreover, lacking diplomatic recognition and a viable economy, Gaza continues to be strangled, creating a desperate and radicalized population. For real, meaningful diplomatic progress to be made, Gaza must be factored into future negotiations.
Fundamentally, however, the decision to again center U.S. Middle East policy on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the right one, and it will hopefully lay the groundwork for real progress to be made in the future. Positive signs have come from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who has expressed willingness for the first time to relinquish control of certain areas of Jerusalem.
Likewise, Israeli and Palestinian teams have been meeting to discuss the contents of a document that will used as the basis for negotiations at the Annapolis conference in November. While these are baby steps, they do indicate that the U.S. has helped kick start the peace process again and that all sides are willing to come to the table. It is a shame that this American desire to facilitate meaningful negotiations has been so late in coming.
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