2008 Woodie Awards
U.S. must adopt sound long-term Pakistan strategy
Issue date: 8/24/07 Section: OpEd Page
In the ongoing fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in central Asia, the case of Pakistan presents some key problems for U.S. policy makers. Nearly six years after the September 11 attacks, and despite more than 10 billion dollars of American military and development funding, as well as strong political support for the Musharraf government, the Taliban remains firmly established in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) along the Afghanistan border.
Frustrated by what they see as a lack of resolve on behalf of President Musharraf to take a tougher military stance against jihadists operating along the border and to sever military ties with the Taliban, there has been talk this summer among U.S. lawmakers of leveraging the Pakistani regime with cuts in aid, should more substantial progress in the field not be made.
However, while there is clearly a strategic necessity to eliminate a cross-border safe haven for radical Islamists, American leaders must be sensitive to the delicate political realities of Pakistani domestic politics, while reevaluating the United States' broader development goals for the country and committing to a policy of active engagement.
Fundamentally, the issue at stake is whether cutting aid to President Musharraf will advance our fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The challenge is that the United States must support a somewhat stable, military regime, while seeking to compel that regime to accept the political and military consequences of taking on the radicals near the border. This is made more difficult by the entanglement of the Pakistani army with Taliban tribal leaders in the FATAs. These associations have lasted for decades and are viewed by many Pakistanis as being beneficial alliances in the event of U.S. disengagement from the region or future conflict with India.
The United States must demonstrate its commitment to Pakistani interests in order to address its own. Policies of greater active engagement should be initiated between U.S. and Pakistani military and intelligence services, fostering trust while sharing resources and information.
Frustrated by what they see as a lack of resolve on behalf of President Musharraf to take a tougher military stance against jihadists operating along the border and to sever military ties with the Taliban, there has been talk this summer among U.S. lawmakers of leveraging the Pakistani regime with cuts in aid, should more substantial progress in the field not be made.
However, while there is clearly a strategic necessity to eliminate a cross-border safe haven for radical Islamists, American leaders must be sensitive to the delicate political realities of Pakistani domestic politics, while reevaluating the United States' broader development goals for the country and committing to a policy of active engagement.
Fundamentally, the issue at stake is whether cutting aid to President Musharraf will advance our fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The challenge is that the United States must support a somewhat stable, military regime, while seeking to compel that regime to accept the political and military consequences of taking on the radicals near the border. This is made more difficult by the entanglement of the Pakistani army with Taliban tribal leaders in the FATAs. These associations have lasted for decades and are viewed by many Pakistanis as being beneficial alliances in the event of U.S. disengagement from the region or future conflict with India.
The United States must demonstrate its commitment to Pakistani interests in order to address its own. Policies of greater active engagement should be initiated between U.S. and Pakistani military and intelligence services, fostering trust while sharing resources and information.
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