Nearly two decades after the Cold War came to a conclusion, its legacy still colors the relationship between the United States and Russia. Unfortunately, distrust and suspicion continue to block meaningful cooperation. The enduring remnants of the war don't signal its revival, though such a turn is always a possibility-one which we must acknowledge and commit ourselves to preventing. Rather this is an instructive portrayal of what we might expect from a relationship with a former enemy. We aren't yet allies, as such a transition takes more than time, but we are no longer purely hostile either.
We exist in a sort of limbo, a purgatory in which we are aware that we don't want to fall back to the hell we previously occupied, but we aren't quite sure of the steps (or our readiness to take them) that will lift us up and out. So the key to survival in our current state is striking the right balance. Before might have been easier because we had only one choice essentially-oppose our enemy. But easier is not better. And while maintaining a balance between the give and take in negotiations demands subtlety and an acceptance that we can not forcibly ensure that we will get our way, the world is better for it. So no matter how frustrating we find the present situation to be, we must persevere.
The first test of our determination is already upon us. The previous administration's announcement of its decision to deploy a missile defense system in Eastern Europe vexed Russia to no end. So as the current administration takes up this issue, it must act with sensitivity to Russian concerns. This doesn't mean that when Russia protests our plan we simply concede. But it does mean that we do more than just duly note the issues they raise. The policy itself is not necessarily the problem, though parts of it might be. The approach to achieving it is actually where the trouble lies. While some may argue that the ends justify the means, if the means aren't possible you aren't going to achieve the ends anyway. The means matter.
Russia's qualms about the missile defense system can't be dismissed. Russia has legitimate reasons to be concerned. The proposed base locations in Poland and the Czech Republic are in its former sphere of influence. If we were to turn the situation on its head, how would we feel if Russia were planning to base a military defense system in a country in South America or in Cuba? As much as we like to assert that spheres of influence are a thing of the past, something that Russia needs to get over, that just isn't the case. We still think the Western Hemisphere is ours to protect, control or exploit depending on who you ask.
When President Bush first unveiled this missile defense system, it was pitched as a way to counter the Iranian treat. Russia, though, feels that the threat posed by Iran has been purposefully exaggerated by the United States, to mask her true aim of neutralizing Russian missiles. Russia points to the chosen base locations as evidence revealing our lie, because according to Russia they aren't ideal for intercepting Iranian missiles but would be convenient for intercepting Russian missiles. While our only source of what the U.S. government's motives are is the government itself, the truth is irrelevant. What matters in this case is what Russia believes to be true. The problem is, in fact, the misperception of motives and intentions. Thus, it follows that what is needed is confidence-building measures.
Since Russia has taken issue with the locations we are seeking to use for our missile defense bases, we need to start a dialogue to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of those locations. We must be specific in our explanation for the reason we chose Poland and the Czech Republic. While we shouldn't enter the dialogue with a mind to change our plans, we should at least be receptive to the possibility of changing base locations if a strong enough argument is made by Russia to warrant it. Even if an agreement that is sufficiently satisfactory to both parties cannot be reached, the effort itself will have had its effect. We want to avoid provoking any other reaction than a diplomatic one from Russia. We don't need to give Russia an excuse to deploy her own missiles on the Polish border. Nor should we fold because she issued such a threat. We must discover the reason she felt compelled to make such a threat, do our best to allay the fears at the source, and go from there.
The tone that Vice President Joe Biden has struck will certainly help ease tensions and sets us up for a good start. But the words must be more than just words; we must keep to their meaning. Our relationship with Russia is important for regional and global security. While it is important that we don't overestimate Russia's influence on Iran, we should recognize that she has some, so any cooperation on that front obviously has value. Still, we can't depend on Russian cooperation to play Iran. For one, the moment Iran sees Russia as nothing more than an American puppet, Russia will lose all influence. So in that sense, the reality of rocky relationship with Russia can be used to our advantage.
Furthermore, with the war in Afghanistan we need a strong relationship with Russia more than ever. The potential closing of the base in Kyrgyzstan means that we will need another route for our supplies into the region, something Russia might be able to help us to accomplish. But more importantly, if indeed Kyrgyzstan's decision was made under Russian pressure, then we need to be concerned with the possible impact of Russian influence on our war efforts. Whether she is trying to reestablish her sphere of influence or demonstrate her global power by showing that American foreign policy can't be executed completely independent of Russian opinion, either way, Russia can't be shoved aside. The relationship is a struggle and will continue to be. But it is in the best interest of the United States. to maintain a friendly, working relationship as best we can by treating Russia as a valued partner.
